Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and Development by Thomas, Chantal
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2006
Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of
Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications
for Law and Development
Chantal Thomas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas, Chantal, "Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and
Development" (2006). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 230.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/230
Cite as: 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 383 (2006)
Essay
Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the
Sociology of Legal Reform: A
Reassessment with Implications for Law
and Development
Chantal Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the influence of Weberian thought on a
particular strain of policy discourse on law and development
that emerged during the mid-twentieth century in the United
States. In particular, this article focuses on the role of Weber in
the work of Talcott Parsons, who developed Structural-
Functionalist sociology. Parsons' work became the foundation
for a generation of sociologists, and laid part of the methodologi-
cal groundwork for contemporary discourse on law and devel-
opment.
Over the past few decades in the social sciences, a new wave
of Weberian scholarship (the "New Weberians") has arisen that
seeks to repair some of the distortions in Parsons' earlier recep-
tion of Weber.1 An early and prominent example of this alterna-
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tive Weberianism arose from the work of three sociologists: Jere
Cohen, Lawrence Hazelrigg, and Whitney Pope ("Cohen et al."),
who stridently critiqued the "Parsonized" understanding of We-
ber.2 Cohen et al. took Parsons to task for downplaying Weber's
understanding of power relations in society, as well as Weber's
acknowledgment of the importance of material dynamics, in fa-
vor of a reading that coincided with classical liberalism's rela-
tive neutrality with respect to the role of government, and in fa-
vor of an overweening emphasis on "ideals" as a determinant of
economic growth.3 A later strain of alternative Weberian analy-
sis, unlike Cohen et al., accepts the methodological focus on ide-
als, but seeks to situate the idealist analysis within an apprecia-
tion of power relations. This second strain of analysis, reflected
for example in the work of Kieran Allen, Sven Eliaeson, Nicho-
las Gane, and Peter Lassman, inherits a sensibility from the
line of critical theorists beginning with the Frankfurt school.
This article seeks to apply these insights to a legal analysis
of Weber. In doing so, this article follows and seeks to merge
two trails established by two prior works of legal scholarship:
David Trubek's Max Weber on Law and Capitalism,4 and Dun-
can Kennedy's The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Ration-
ality, or Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contem-
porary Mode of Western Legal Thought.5  Trubek's article,
written in 1972, explains Weber as an intellectual precursor of
contemporary law and development theory; written ahead of the
bulk of New Weberian scholarship, it anticipates and engages a
critical re-reading of Weber. Kennedy's article, written in 2004,
COMPANION TO WEBER 83, 86 (Stephen Turner ed., 2000).
One obstacle to understanding is the peculiar reception history of Weber's
work. Much of post-Second World War social science has worked with a
rather simplified and misleading account of Weber's intentions, and often,
until very recently, as a result of the incomplete character of translation,
with a fragmentary knowledge of his work. Consequently, Weber's central
concepts have frequently been assimilated to the language of the modern
social sciences in an uncritical manner.
Id.
2. Jere Cohen, Lawrence Hazelrigg & Whitney Pope, Deparsonizing Weber: A
Critique of Parsons' Interpretation of Weber's Sociology, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 229, 229
(1975) [hereinafter Cohen et al.].
3. See id.
4. David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS.
L. REV. 720, 720 (1972).
5. Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Rationality, or
Max Weber's Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of West-
ern Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031 (2004).
6. Trubek, supra note 4, at 737 n.31.
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delves more squarely into the New Weberian project in the hu-
manities and social sciences of critically reassessing the recep-
tion of Weberian theory.7 However, because it was written as a
general exposition of Weber's role in contemporary legal
thought, it does not apply itself to the problematique of law and
development. Inspired by both works, the objective of this arti-
cle is to understand how a critical re-reading of Weber might
impact the particular field of law and development.
I. WEBER'S CENTRAL INSIGHTS
Weber's most influential analyses relating to the role of gov-
ernance and growth are: (1) the analysis, in Part I of his Econ-
omy and Society, of three "ideal types" of rule-traditional, char-
ismatic, and rationalen, with rationalen being the type of rule
characteristic of modern Western society;8 (2) the analysis, in
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, of the way in
which religious values supported the development of capitalistic
practices in Western Europe, through the association of reli-
gious virtue with capitalistic practices such as saving, invest-
ment, and profit, and as a comparison with certain other socie-
ties, such as China and India, that attained significant levels of
technology but did not undergo industrialization; 9 and (3) the
rise of bureaucracy as the expression of both the "disenchant-
ment" of modern society inherent in its drive towards rationali-
zation, and its "reenchantment" through the establishment and
inculcation of relationships between groups vying for power."
A. THEORETICAL INSIGHT #1: "IDEAL TYPES" OF GOVERNANCE
While Weber's work was ultimately deemed a cornerstone of
sociology, he was in fact trained as an economist; therefore, his
work often investigated the social dimensions of economic activ-
ity." In his historical and comparative sociology, Weber sought
7. See generally Kennedy, supra note 5.
8. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth & R. Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., 1968) (1956) [hereinafter ECONOMY AND SOCIETY].
9. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 2nd Impression 1948) (1904) [hereinafter
PROTESTANT ETHIC].
10. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
11. Richard Swedberg, Max Weber as an Economist and as a Sociologist: To-
wards a Fuller Understanding of Weber's View of Economics, 58 AM. J. ECON. & SOC.
561 (1999).
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to explain why "the modern system of industrial (or 'bourgeois')
capitalism emerged in Europe, but not other parts of the
world .... European law had unique features which made it
more conducive to capitalism than were the legal systems of
other civilizations."
12
Weber employed a methodology of "ideal types" in his socio-
logical history, seeking to identify and categorize societies on
the basis of a heuristic framework. Though elements of each
category were present in every society, Weber believed that such
a framework would aid in understanding the distinctive quali-
ties of particular societies as well as their relationship to each
other. Particularly influential was Weber's framework of sys-
tems of governance 13-what he called Herrschaft.
The starting point for this framework was the sense that
modern Western governance was characterized by a commit-
ment within its legal systems to the goal of "logically formal ra-
tionality." Per David Trubek's fine summary, legal thought is
"rational to the extent that it relies on some justification that
transcends the particular case, and is based on existing, unam-
biguous rules"; it is "formal to the extent that the criteria of de-
cision are intrinsic to the legal system"; and it is "logical to the
extent that rules or principles are consciously constructed by
specialized modes of legal thought which rely on. .. systemati-
zation, and to the extent that decisions of specific cases are
12. Trubek, supra note 4, at 722. Trubek's discussion of Weber remains the au-
thoritative treatment in the American legal academy of the Weberian understanding
of the role of law in development. I discovered Trubek's work as a law student, and
am indebted to him for showing me that such topics had been and could be success-
fully incorporated into one's career as a lawyer and legal scholar. Most of the cita-
tions that follow in this section refer to Trubek's essay, but Trubek in turn relied
primarily on three sources: Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans.,
1954); REINHARD BENDIX, MAX WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 385-457 (1962);
and Weber's essay, Sociology of Law, which appears in 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,
supra note 8, at 641-900. The advantage of Trubek's treatment is not only that it
synthesizes these disparate sources on Weber's sociology of law, but also that it re-
orients them in a way readily accessible to a legal, as opposed to a sociological, disci-
plinary perspective.
13. In employing the term "governance" here, the objective is to use a term that
in contemporary English can describe modes of socially authoritative decision mak-
ing without necessarily interjecting an explicitly normative sense of whether they
are politically valid or desirable. Thus the emerging literature on governance ap-
proaches the topic from a range of perspectives: the attempt to categorize and de-
scribe neutrally existing systems of governance; the critique of current systems; and
the proposal of new systems of governance or improvements in current systems.
Weber's own sense of Herrschaft has changed over time, and is one of the foci of re-
cent re-readers. See infra Part II.C..
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reached by processes of specialized deductive logic proceeding
from previously established rules or principles."14
Logically formal rationality in the law aided the tendencies
in European society towards capitalistic economic growth in two
primary ways. First, it weakened the hold traditional ruling
classes had on the levers of power, and as such allowed rela-
tively autonomous groups-critically, capitalists and workers-
to emerge.15 Second, it channeled the exercise of legal power
into predictable processes and results, thus enabling market ac-
tors to rely on contract and property rights to structure their in-
teractions and to achieve greater efficiency therein. 1
6
Written in the early twentieth century, Weber's concepts of
logically formal rationality and the rise of capitalism will seem
eminently familiar to legal scholars today: they have become
touchstones in the field of law and economics. Freedom from in-
terference in legal outcomes by "irrational" sources, whether
they be status-based pressure (what some might describe as a
variant of "corruption") or equitable considerations, has been
argued to be central to the ability of market actors to operate ef-
ficiently. Predictability, flowing in part from this freedom from
interference, but also from the commitment to formal rational-
ity, has also been argued to be crucial to efficient market activ-
ity. Thus, according to Weber, "the rationalization and systema-
tization of the law in general and.. . the increasing calculability
of the functioning of the legal process in particular, constituted
one of the most important conditions for the existence of ...
capitalistic enterprise, which cannot do without legal security.
" 17
Logically formal rationality, as a central characteristic of
modern Western governance, could be contrasted against modes
of governance visible in other societies. The "traditional" mode
based its authority on claims to customary or familial status: an
"established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and
the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them."8 The
"charismatic" mode, which based its authority on the claims of a
14. Trubek, supra note 4, at 730. As Trubek pointed out, the English common
law system constituted an important counterfactual example for Weber's hypothesis.
See id. at 746-48.
15. Id. at 744.
16. Id. at 742-43.
17. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 883. For a more detailed working
out of the relationship, see generally David Trubek, Towards a Social Theory of
Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Politics in Economic Development, 82 YALE
L.J. 1 (1972).
18. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 215.
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particular ruler to a special authority based on that ruler's ex-
traordinary qualities,' bears a family resemblance to the "cult
of personality. ,
20
B. THEORETICAL INSIGHT #2: PROTESTANT VALUES AND THE RISE
OF CAPITALISM
Weber's essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism sets forth what is undoubtedly his most widely influen-
tial concept, reaching beyond the academy to everyday conven-
tional wisdom. Written contemporaneously with a voyage to the
United States,2 ' Weber sought to explain why, notwithstanding
the general characteristic of "rationalism" in the law amongst
European societies, capitalistic behavior had taken root more
strongly in some as opposed to others within this group. In par-
ticular, Weber sought to explain the reasons why those "districts
of highest economic development" were at the same time most
amenable to Protestantism and "revolution in the Church."22
Weber rejected the explanation that "the greater participa-
tion of Protestants in the positions of ownership and manage-
ment in modern economic life may... be understood... simply
as a result of the greater material wealth they have inherited."23
He also rejected as simplistic the notion that success in capital-
ism flowed from a "secularization of all ideals through Protes-
tantism."24
Rather, Weber argued that the particular intensity of capi-
talistic behavior among some-especially Calvinist-
19. Weber defined charisma as:
[Tihe quality of a personality, held to be out of the ordinary (and originally
thought to have magical sources, both in the case of the prophets and men
who are wise in healing or in law, the leaders of the hunt or heroes in war),
on account of which the person is evaluated as being gifted with supernatu-
ral or superhuman or at least specifically out of the ordinary powers not ac-
cessible to everybody, and hence as a "leader."
Id. at 241.
20. Id. at 244 ("Within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudi-
ates the past .... The only basis of legitimacy for it is personal charisma....").
21. Part One, setting out "The Problem" of greater economic development in
Protestant societies and Luther's idea of the calling, was published in 1904 just be-
fore Weber's trip to the United States. Part Two, elaborating on the "Practical Eth-
ics of the Ascetic Branches of Protestantism," was published shortly after his return.
See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 93
(1996). For an examination of Weber's views on America, see id.
22. PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 9, at 36.
23. Id. at 37.
24. Id. at 40.
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denominations arose from an alliance of religious virtue, on the
one hand, with economic gain, on the other.25 Within this world-
view, economic gain was expressive of religious virtue. As such,
the pious individual was obligated by his religious calling to
maximize his material gain.26
This conceptual shift constituted what Weber called a "re-
versal" of the "natural relationship:"27 "A man does not 'by na-
ture' wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as
he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for
,,2' rthat purpose. The P otestant ethic of which Weber wrote,
however, contradicted this "traditional manner of life" and "tra-
ditional rate of profit."29 In holding that "[elconomic acquisition
is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfac-
tion of his material needs," ° this shift laid the foundation in-
stead for a "new spirit, the spirit of modern capitalism."3
The Protestant ethic arose from a foundation of "rational-
ism" which characterized more generally the trend within Euro-
pean societies. This rationalism was filtered through Martin
Luther's conception of the calling, in which "the valuation of the
fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs [wias the highest form
which the moral activity of the individual could assume";3 2 that
is, one's religiosity manifested itself in engagement with, rather
than "monastic" disassociation from, worldly activity.
According to Weber, Luther's conception of the calling re-
mained "traditionalistic .... The individual should remain...
in the station... in which God had placed him, and should re-
strain his worldly activity within the limits imposed by his es-
tablished station in life."33 The later Calvinist, Baptist and
Methodist denominations within Protestantism would, however,
press into new service the notion of worldly activity as indica-
tive of grace: worldly activity now not only manifested one's sal-
vation, but actually proved one's worthiness of being saved. 4
25. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
26. See id.
27. PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 9, at 53.
28. Id. at 60.
29. Id. at 67.
30. Id. at 53.
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id. at 80.
33. Id. at 85.
34. Id. at 121 (discussing the contribution by Calvinism of the "idea of the ne-
cessity of proving one's faith in worldly activity"). Primary to the development of
this approach, according to Weber, was the Calvinist idea of predestination. Al-
though at first blush the idea that "some men and angels are predestinated unto ev-
2006]
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These perspectives required the individual "methodically to su-
pervise his own state of grace in his own conduct, and thus to
penetrate it with asceticism."35  The notion of asceticism as a
prerequisite to salvation required an intense unification and
"rationalization of conduct within this world ... for the sake of
the world beyond."36
This drive to rationalize and unify one's conduct according
to ascetic principles lent itself to, and meshed with, the rational-
istic emphasis of capitalism on the measurement of production
for the maximization of gain. Thus, "[t]hat powerful tendency
toward uniformity of life, which to-day so immensely aids the
capitalistic interest in the standardization of production, had its
ideal foundations in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh."8
The "accumulation of capital" was aided not only by this
emphasis on uniform and disciplined conduct, but also at least
as importantly by the "ascetic compulsion to save" as a form of
abnegation of worldly enjoyment and therefore an indication of
grace.39  "Waste" was the "deadliest of sins."" By contrast,
"wealth" was harmful "only... as a temptation to idleness and
sinful enjoyment of life."4' Hence, saving and investment indi-
erlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death," id. at 100 (quoting the
Westminster Confession of 1647), would appear to render moot any possible contri-
butions through one's conduct to salvation or damnation, the doctrine developed into
two tenets which would place worldly conduct at the center of salvation. Weber ex-
plained:
On the one hand, it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself cho-
sen, and to combat all doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-
confidence is the result of insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace ....
On the other hand, in order to attain that self-confidence intense worldly
activity is recommended as the most suitable means.
Id. at 111-12. Although Baptism and Methodism rejected the doctrine of predesti-
nation, Weber argued that they reached the same endpoint by alternative means: in
the case of Methodism, the "aspiration to the higher life ... served. . . as a sort of
makeshift for the doctrine of predestination." Id. at 142-43. In the case of Baptist
doctrine, the "immense importance... attributed by the.., doctrine of salvation to
the role of the conscience as the revelation of God to the individual gave.., conduct
in worldly callings ... the greatest significance for the development of the spirit of
capitalism." Id. at 150-51.
35. Id. at 153.
36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 157.
38. Id. at 169.
39. Id. at 172 ("The restraints which were imposed upon the consumption of
wealth naturally served to increase it by making possible the productive investment
of capital.").
40. Id.
41. Id.
[Vol. 15:2
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cated both that virtuous industriousness had generated profit,
and that virtuous piety had led to the refusal to enjoy that profit
in the form of personal consumption. Saving and investment
became principal indicatives of virtue, at the same time that
they furthered capitalistic ends.
Finally, Protestant asceticism gave a particular moralized
underpinning to the emergence of waged workforces employed
by capitalist entrepreneurs. To begin with, according to Weber,
ascetic literature generally condoned the "idea that faithful la-
bour, even at low wages, on the part of those whom life offers no
other opportunities, is highly pleasing to God" and ultimately
"the only means of attaining certainty of grace."" In addition,
Protestantism "legalized the exploitation of this specific willing-
ness to work, in that it also interpreted the employer's business
activity as a calling." 3 The pressure imposed by employers upon
workers to achieve increasing profits not only failed to offend,
but actually furthered, this particular conception of virtue.
Thus, both with respect to the capitalistic labor force and with
respect to the capitalistic employer, Protestant asceticism pro-
vided a special motivation: "The emphasis on the ascetic impor-
tance of a fixed calling provided an ethical justification of the
modern specialized division of labour. In a similar way the
providential interpretation of profit-making justified the activi-
ties of the business man.""
Surrounding the content of this analysis, Weber established
several caveats. First, the integration of Protestant asceticism
into capitalistic life was not anything intended by its authors:
"the cultural consequences of the Reformation were to a great
extent... unforeseen and even unwished-for results of the la-
bours of the reformers. They were often far removed from or
even in contradiction to all that they themselves thought to at-
tain."45
In a second caveat, Weber specifically discouraged an inter-
pretation of his work that privileged religious or cultural values
above other causal dynamics of societal change. On the con-
trary, in view of the "interdependent influences" of "material
basis," "forms of social and political organization," and "ideas," it
would be "foolish and doctrinaire" to assert that "capitalism...
could only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the
42. Id. at 178.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 163.
45. Id. at 90.
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[Protestant] Reformation."46 Weber emphasized that it was "not
[his] aim" to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally
one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of... history."
47
Rather, the goal of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism was much more modestly to "as far as possible clarify...
what concrete aspects of our capitalistic culture can be traced
to" religious movements, keeping in mind the interdependence
of material, social, political and ideational "relationships."8
As a final caveat, Weber argued that, although religious as-
ceticism had helped to give rise to the "spirit of modern capital-
ism" through its emphasis on "rational conduct on the basis of
the calling, 9 the capitalistic system "no longer need[ed] the
support of any religious forces."5 ° To the contrary, "[slince as-
cetism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals
in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and fi-
nally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previ-
ous period in history."5' Weber's view of the societal end-point of
this trajectory was indeed somewhat gloomy: religious asceti-
cism ultimately gave rise to a dynamic that undermined its own
importance in the production of wealth, so that all that re-
mained was the latter. It was in the United States, which had
inspired Weber to write The Protestant Ethic, that he saw this
dynamic most clearly: "[iun the field of its highest development,
in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its reli-
gious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with
purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the char-
acter of sport."5
2
This last point is perhaps most surprising from the point of
view of the popular reception of Weberian thought. The Protes-
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism did not set out to cele-
brate either modernism or capitalism. Indeed, Weber ended his
study on a decisively somber note:
No one knows... whether at the end of this tremendous develop-
ment.., there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or...
mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-
importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might
well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without
46. Id. at 91.
47. Id. at 183.
48. Id. at 91-92.
49. Id. at 181.
50. Id. at 72.
51. Id. at 181.
52. Id. at 182.
392 [Vo1.15:2
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heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization
never before achieved."
C. THEORETICAL INSIGHT #3: THE "IRON CAGE" OF
BUREAUCRACY
The "tragic vision of history"54 suggested by Weber's gloomy
assessment of modem capitalism at the end of The Protestant
Ethic is perhaps most expressly elaborated in Weber's writings
on the bureaucratization of modem government. Perhaps be-
cause Weber's writings on bureaucracy remain somewhat less
familiar than his "ideal types" and "protestant ethic" insights,
they appear to form his most intricate observations (this set of
insights also seems to prefigure many of the arguments of criti-
cal theorists writing later in the twentieth century).55 This theo-
retical intricacy and relative unfamiliarity means that some-
what more attention will be given here to describing this
particular theoretical insight.
1. Bureaucracy, Rationalization and Disenchantment
In Economy and Society, Weber identified bureaucratic gov-
ernment- "general rules, hierarchy, full-time officials, special-
ized training, and so on',6-as a central feature of the process of
53. Id.
54. DIGGINS, supra note 21, at 10 (attributing to Weber a "vision of history, re-
ligion, society and politics" that "contains several dimensions of tragedy"). Diggins
links this tragic sensibility with Weber's appreciation for the writings of Nietzsche
and Simmel, within German philosophy, and also in Weber's knowledge of the
"themes of Attic tragedy." See id. Weber's description also, in some ways, resembles
Durkheim's rendition of anomie in modern life. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM,
THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., The Free Press 1947)
(1893).
55. See, e.g., NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY:
RATIONALIZATION VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 81-150 (2002) (demonstrating, inter
alia, analytical similarities between Weber's writings on rationalization and re-
enchantment, and those of Foucault, Baudrillard and Lyotard); NILS GILMAN,
MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004) (alluding to how the Frankfurt School em-
ployed "Weber's (and Freud's and Nietzsche's) cultural pessimism about an adminis-
tered world to criticize American mass culture"); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1076
("To a degree that has continually surprised me. .. Weber's sociology of law, in con-
junction with his general sociology of disenchantment, seems to lead to the conclu-
sion that much critical legal studies work, in the skeptical vein, has been reinven-
tion, or adaptation to view non-Weberian purposes, of Weberian wheels.").
56. Jon Elster, Rationality, Economy and Society, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO WEBER, supra note 1, at 21, 22.
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societal rationalization:57
From a purely technical point of view, a bureaucracy is capable of at-
taining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally
the most rational known means of exercising authority over human be-
ings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possi-
ble a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of
the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally su-
perior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations and
is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.
58
Bureaucratization not only grew out of the rationalization
process, but constituted the only realistic way of administering
the complex societal forms that accompany it.59 Because "logi-
cally formal rationality" in society also accompanies the emer-
gence of capitalism, it follows that bureaucratic administration
is ultimately necessary for the preservation of the formally-
rational legal system that allows capitalism to thrive." Indeed,
bureaucratization in governance was none other than an appli-
cation of the same principles of rationality and technological
progress that produced industrialization. 6' Bureaucratic ration-
ality also represents the triumph of "instrumental rationality" 
62
over "value rationality," the latter being Weber's term for "con-
57. Id.
This whole process of rationalization, in the factory as elsewhere, and espe-
cially in the bureaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the
material implements of organization in the hands of the master. Thus, dis-
cipline inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction of politi-
cal and economic needs is increasingly rationalized.
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8 at 1156.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 224 ("The needs of mass administration make it today completely in-
dispensable. The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of
administration.").
60. Cf. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 212 (H. H. Gerth
& C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1946) [hereinafter
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY] ("To this extent increasing bureaucratization is a function of
the increasing possession of goods used for consumption, and of an increasingly so-
phisticated technique of fashioning external life-a technique which corresponds to
the opportunities provided by such wealth.").
61. Id. at 214 ("The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organiza-
tion has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organi-
zation. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organiza-
tions exactly as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of production.").
62. Elster, supra note 56, at 23 ("[Tlhe substantive rationality of legal and bu-
reaucratic institutions [in Weber's thought] is a form of instrumental adaptation.
Whereas individual value-rational action is oriented towards a specific behavior
without regard for its consequences ... substantively rational action is guided by its
consequences.").
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scious belief as a value for its own sake." 3
Bureaucratic governance, "guided by instrumental reason,"
therefore "lies in stark contrast to pre-modern forms" of govern-
ance-traditional and charismatic-which confer validity on
value-rational grounds. 4 As a triumph of instrumental rational-
ity, bureaucratization represented modern capitalism's van-
quishing of the Protestant Ethic. Whereas Protestant asceti-
cism at one time provided a justification of certain kinds of
rationalistic, maximizing behaviors as ends in themselves, mod-
ern capitalism supplanted these justifications with those that
valued such behaviors for the maximizations they produced."
This was one of the paradoxes that Weber underscored: the
way in which the very religious values that helped to propel
modern activity in the form of industry in the economic sphere,
scientific inquiry, and even the rule of law ultimately created
institutions that would destabilize the values that birthed them.
In "depicting this movement from God... to the disenchant-
ment of religious forms," Weber "adheres to a Nietzschean the-
sis: the highest values devalue themselves."6
This devaluation of values was what Weber called the "dis-
63. WEBER ON LAW, supra note 57, at 24-25. As Weber explained in Economy
and Society, social behavior could be explained in four possible ways: (1) "instrumen-
tally rational," or consequentialist, grounds; (2) "value-rational" grounds; (3) "effec-
tual" grounds, or "specific affects and feeling states"; or (4) "traditional" grounds,
that is, "ingrained habituation." Id.
64. GANE, supra note 55, at 25 (discussing "rationalization and disenchant-
ment" in Weberian theory). Gane explained:
Both these types of domination are personal rather than impersonal forms
of rule, and neither is grounded upon a system of rational law. On the one
hand, traditional authority... proceeds 'by virtue of age-old rules and pow-
ers'. ... On the other, charismatic authority, while based on personal de-
votion to the leader or hero (prophet), is foreign to rules and proceeds
through the repudiation of past authority.
Id. at 25. "[Both] traditional and charismatic authority... are orders of personal
authority that demand unlimited personal obligation .... [With rationalization
both] tend to be replaced by the impersonal rule of the modern (capitalist) bureau-
cratic state." Id. at 26; see also ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 60, at 229
("[T]he ... apparatus [bureaucracy], with its peculiar, 'impersonal' character... is
easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it. A rationally
ordered system of officials continues to function smoothly after the enemy has occu-
pied the area; he merely needs to change the top officials.").
65. See, e.g., DIGGINS, supra note 21, at 26 (describing Weber's theory of capi-
talism as a "sociological phenomenon springing up originally from religious convic-
tions, which would eventually give way to secularization as the entrepreneur con-
tinued to demonstrate his qualifications as a Christian by his business integrity").
66. GANE, supra note 55, at 21 (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO
POWER 9 (Walter Kaufman & R. J. Hollingdale trans., Random House 1978) (1901)).
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enchantment" of modem society. In his discussion of "Moderni-
zation as Societal Rationalization," Jurgen Habermas quotes a
passage from Weber's little-translated essay entitled Zwischen-
betrachtung or "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Di-
rections":
The rational knowledge to which ethical religiosity had itself appealed
followed its own autonomous and innerworldly norms. It fashioned a
cosmos of truths which no longer had anything to do with the system-
atic postulates of a rational religious ethic .... On the contrary, ra-
tional knowledge had to reject this claim in principle... although the
science that created this cosmos seemed unable to answer with cer-
tainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions.
6 7
Much as with his analysis of the Protestant Ethic, Weber's
theorizing of bureaucracy hardly celebrated modernity. Rather,
Weber literally despaired of the rise of bureaucratization. In his
remarks to a 1901 academic conference in Vienna, Weber ex-
claimed:
The passion for bureaucracy... is enough to drive one to despair...
but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of
mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme
mastery of the bureaucratic way of life .... 68 only wish to challenge
the unquestioning idolization of bureaucracy.
Disenchantment resulting from bureaucratization thus con-
stituted one of the "baleful consequences" arising from the "no-
blest impulses" of modernity. 6
2. Bureaucracy, Irrationality and "Anti-Formalism"
The "baleful consequences" of rationalization and bureauc-
ratization extended beyond the disenchantment of modem life.
67. 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 229 (Thomas MacCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1984) (1981). Thus, Weber showed how disenchantment was hydraulically related
to modern processes of analysis with more dynamic methodology than Durkheim's
anomie, which identified a similar malaise in modernity, but attributed it to the pre-
eminence of individualism over group identity, rather than to the very means of rea-
soning within modernity.
68. Max Weber, Remarks Delivered to Colleagues in the Verein fir Sozial-
politik at the Vienna Meeting (1909) (translated as Max Weber on Bureaucracy in
JACOB PETER MAYER, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
SOCIOLOGY 125 (Farber & Farber 1956) (1944)) [hereinafter Max Weber on Bureauc-
racy].
69. Alan Sica, Rationalization and Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
WEBER, supra note 1, at 54, 54 (citing Benjamin Nelson, Discussion on Industrializa-
tion and Capitalism, in MAX WEBER AND SOCIOLOGY 161, 167-68 (Otto Stammer ed.,
Kathleen Morris trans., Oxford Basil Blackwell 1971) (1965)).
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Indeed, in a turn of analysis reflected by later critical theory,
Weber showed how the terrain of a rationalized governance ul-
timately became susceptible to a peculiarly modern form of irra-
tionality.
This irrationality flows from the very dynamic that gener-
ated rationalization, namely the "devaluation of ultimate val-
ues."" In addition to producing the rationalized world of "stable
calculations," rationalization allows for:
[The] emergence of a polytheistic and disordered world of competing
values and ideals. For with the rise of modern scientific (or "rational")
knowledge, religion is, for the first time, challenged by the disparate
claims of other life-orders (Lebensordnungen), the economic, political,
aesthetic, erotic and intellectual, which, with the onset of modernity,
separate out into relatively autonomous realms .... 71
Scientific rationality has both displaced prior ultimate
means of assessing values and failed by its own terms to provide
a replacement: the result is that competing non-scientific value
systems persist at the same time that they are unable to estab-
lish supremacy according to the overarching scientific logic.
"The transition to modernity is thus a paradoxical one, for it
brings new 'rational' means for controlling and systematizing
life while at the same time inaugurating an endless struggle be-
tween (and within) opposing value-spheres."72
This paradoxical tendency towards irrationality surfaces
even within the modern legal system, premised on "logically for-
mal rationality." Within the legal system, the proliferation of
values resurfaces as the "rise of policy analysis."73 The devalua-
tion of values destroys the "immanent" quality of law-that is,
natural law becomes replaced by positive law.7 ' Habermas
summarizes the turn to policy: "[i rom the perspective of a for-
mal ethic based on general principles, legal norms ... now
count as mere conventions that can be considered hypothetically
and enacted positively."
75
On the one hand, the demise of "immanent" constraints on
70. GANE, supra note 55, at 29.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1071.
74. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 874-75 ("The disappearance of the
old natural law conceptions has destroyed all possibility of providing the law with a
metaphysical dignity by virtue of its immanent qualities."); see also Kennedy, supra
note 5, at 1065 ("Positivism becomes the theory of lawmaking because natural law is
implausible in theory.").
75. HABERMAS, supra note 67, at 162-63.
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lawmaking increased the authority of lawmakers to act as arbi-
ters between "mere" norms. On the other, the modern system
expressly turned to lawmakers as the positivist authority for re-
solving such conflicts. Hence lawmakers, in Weber's under-
standing of "politics as a vocation," are torn between the "ethics
of conviction," in which action was justified on "value-rational"
grounds or "immanent norms," and the "ethics of responsibility,"
in which lawmakers consider the outcomes of their decisions on
an instrumentally rational basis that must take into account po-
litical "responsibility for the predictable consequences of the ac-
tion."6 This tension is exacerbated, Kennedy writes, by the "dy-
namism of the capitalist economy [which] generate[s],
constantly, increasingly, legal gaps or conflicts involving large
economic and political stakes. ""
The result is that the peculiar tendency of irrationality in
modern society is reflected in the "anti-formal tendencies of
modem law."78 Of modem law, Weber concludes: "In the great
majority of its most important provisions, it has been unmasked
all too visibly, indeed, as the product or the technical means of a
compromise between conflicting interests."
3. Bureaucracy, Democracy and Power
Weber's conceptualization of conflicting interests in modem
life understood politics as a struggle for power. 80 In opposition
to the Marxian view of modern power politics as essentially
class-based, Weber argued that power could be measured and
distributed according to class, status, or party.8' Although such
struggle could take multiple shapes, Weber nevertheless in-
sisted on an analytical lens that acknowledged the "violence of
this struggle and the violence of political power."'" Indeed, We-
ber defined the state as "'that human community which (suc-
cessfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical vio-
76. MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 16 (Edward A.
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949); see also GANE, supra note 55, at 64-69.
77. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1067.
78. Id. at 1064.
79. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 875; see also GANE, supra note 55,
at 40-41; Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1066.
80. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 1415 ("The essence of politics is
struggle.").
81. ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 60, at 180-95.
82. GANE, supra note 55, at 74.
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lence."'8 3 This perspective demonstrates the influence on We-
ber's theory of Nietzsche's writings, not only in the analysis of
disenchantment as the "devaluation of values," 4 but also in the
analysis of governance as power struggle. 85 Thus, Weber stated
in Economy and Society that "[w]ithout exception every sphere
of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of domi-
nancy."1
6
The political struggle that Weber analyzed in modern soci-
ety was subject to two competing dynamics: bureaucratization,
on the one hand, and democratization, on the other." Bureauc-
ratization reproduced a form of social oligarchy. Due to the
large scale of organizational complexity required to govern in
modern bureaucracies, power tended to consolidate in hierarchi-
cal form favoring technocratic elites. 8 At the same time, the
"leveling of distinctions" based on traditional status in modern
society produced a dynamic of democratization.8 9 These two dy-
namics could produce tendencies in two possible directions: "ei-
ther 'administering' the mass of citizens deprived of rights and
freedoms like a herd of cattle in a bureaucratic 'authoritarian
state' with pseudo-parliamentarianim, or else including the citi-
83. Lassman, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting MAX WEBER, POLITICAL WRITINGS
310-11 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994 [herein-
after POLITICAL WRITINGS]).
84. Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modern Age, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER, supra note 1, at 99, 101; see also FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 11 (Thomas Common trans., Modern Library
1995) (1883). The coda in Weber on "specialists without spirit" is Weber's version of
those "last men who invented happiness" pilloried in Nietzsche's prologue to
Zarathustra. Scaff, supra note 84, at 101. Nietzsche said:
I will speak of the most contemptible thing; that... is the last man! ...
"What is love? What is creation? ... What is a star?"-so asketh the last
man and blinketh. The earth hath then become small, and on it there hop-
peth the last man who maketh everything small... ."We have discovered
happiness"-say the last men, and blink ....
NIETZSCHE, supra note 84, at 11.
85. KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7-8 (2004).
86. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 941.
87. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 267. Weber placed bureaucracy
within the governance category of "logically formal rationality," and democracy
within the category of "charismatic" authority; "[ellective officials whose legitimacy
is derived from the confidence of the ruled and who are therefore subject to recall...
are not 'bureaucratic' types." Id. at 267; see also id. at 219.
88. This observation of Weber's was subsequently developed by fellow sociolo-
gist Robert Michels as an "iron law of oligarchy" in modern societies. See generally
ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul
trans., The Free Press 1964) (1915).
89. Scaff, supra note 84, at 106.
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
zens as participants in the state."9"
Both types of governance-"pseudo-democracy" and "par-
ticipatory democracy"-were entirely possible outcomes of the
modern rationalization process. Indeed, between the two, We-
ber appeared to believe the former to be the more likely out-
come. The threat to democratic governance from modem ra-
tionalization stemmed not only from its tendency towards
bureaucratic hierarchy, but also from the cultural acclimation of
citizens to their role as "little cogs, little men clinging to little
jobs and striving toward bigger ones" within the "machinery" of
modern bureaucratic capitalism:
92
That the world should know no men but these: it is in such an evolu-
tion that we are already caught up, and the great question is, there-
fore, not how we can promote and hasten it, but what can we oppose to
this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this
parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureau-
cratic way of life.
9 3
In other words, concerted effort was required to maintain
even the viability of democratic government in the modern
state. Weber clearly viewed modern bureaucratization as both
inevitable and in many ways distasteful. Weber also saw de-
mocracy as under threat from the modernity's more central fea-
ture, bureaucratic rationalization in government. Weber saw
this dynamic most clearly in his own country, where the post-
Bismarckian state appeared to have choked off real democratic
participation.94
From the foregoing characterizations, one might infer We-
ber's allegiance to a contractarian set of ideals regarding the
normative foundation for democratic governance and the rule of
90. Id. at 106 (quoting Max Weber, Zur Politik im Weltkrieg: Schriften und
Reden, 1914-18 [On Policy During the World War: Writings and Speeches 1914-18]
in MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE 396, 396 (Mohr Siebeck 1984).
91. See infra notes 104-107.
92. Weber on Bureaucracy, supra note 68, at 126-27.
93. Id. at 128.
94. Sven Eliaeson, Constitutional Ceasarism: Weber's Politics in their German
Context, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER, supra note 1, at 131, 136. Weber
very much was responding to the political context of Germany: the danger of domi-
nation by the feudalistic Junker class, who were "anti-modernist and backward-
looking" and dependent on economic protectionism by the state; the weakness of the
bourgeoisie, coupled with their "antipolitical" tendencies ("in part to a long tradition
of Romantic skepticism about the Enlightenment, and in part to a sense of impo-
tence resulting from the failure of the liberals to unify Germany in 1848"). Id. We-
ber expressed worry about whether "'the German bourgeoisie has the maturity... to
be the leading political class'"; and dislike of the working class and its journalist
leaders who were poseurs. Id. (quoting POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 83, at 23).
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law, and a commitment to the normative egalitarianism found
in social contract theorists of the modern state such as John
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Such an inference would be
mistaken, however. Weber does not appear to have shared the
focus of these Enlightenment theorists on the normative neces-
sity of universal political liberalism. Sven Eliaeson has written
that:
[Weber] was a liberal in the sense of being deeply concerned about the
individual as an autonomous cultural being .... But he did not defend
this as an universal principle... [and] [ilndeed he did not think that
this was feasible for ordinary people, governed by the necessity of mak-
ing a living .... This was an aristocratic notion of autonomy rather
than a principled universalistic one.
95
This indifference of Weber's to Enlightenment ideals," and
their foundations in the political philosophies of classical antiq-
uity,97 manifested itself, secondly, in a sharply circumscribed
understanding even of "real," participatory democracy.
Weber asserted that "[tirue democracy means... submis-
sion to a leader whom the people have elected themselves."98
Thus, the choice between "participatory democracy" and
"pseudo-parliamentary democracy" appeared to boil down to the
difference between "a leadership democracy with a 'machine'
and [a] democracy without a leader, which means rule by the
'professional politicians.'"99  Thus, Weber played an important
role in ensuring that the Weimar constitution allowed the presi-
dent to be elected directly by the people rather than parlia-
ment,'00 but at the same time held a very limited view of the
people's ability to hold the president accountable at any but the
most general level.'0 '
95. Id. at 137.
96. Alistair Hamilton, Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER, supra note 1, at 151, 163 (describing the
lack of influence of Locke on Weber).
97. Lassman, supra note 1, at 91 (describing Weber's rejection of Aristotelian
classifications of government in favor of his own "command"-based typology).
98. ALLEN, supra note 85, at 171 (quoting D. BEETHAM, MAX WEBER AND THE
THEORY OF MODERN POLITICS 236 (1974)).
99. Id. at 142 (citing Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 83, at 351. This quote resembles that from Eliae-
son. See supra note 94.
100. WEIMARER VERFASSUNG [WEIMAR CONSTITUTION] art. 41 (1919).
101. Hence the following recorded exchange between the reactionary General
Ludendorff and Weber, "Ludendorff: What is your idea of a democracy, then? We-
ber: In a democracy the people choose a leader whom they trust. Then the chosen
man says, 'Now shut your mouths and obey me. The people and the parties are no
longer free to interfere in the leader's business.'" The exchange between Weber and
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Thus, Weber's understanding of democracy stemmed from a
pragmatic, rather than a normative, orientation. Weber saw
democracy-at the aforementioned "plebiscitary" level-as nec-
essary to break the chokehold of the landholding interests who
were stalling Germany's capitalist economic growth. Democ-
racy, Weber believed, could help to mobilize Germany's rela-
tively weak bourgeoisie. 10 2  In this sense, democracy in Ger-
many's particular context could help to propel capitalism. The
converse relationship-that capitalism would automatically give
rise to democracy-was not a Weberian hypothesis. Moreover,
the relationship between democracy and economic growth that
Weber desired would not naturally arise but rather had to be
pursued through concerted reform.
Lufendorff, according to Eliasson, came at the end of the World War I when Weber
was trying to convince Lufendorff to "give himself up to the Allies." Eliaeson, supra
note 94, at 146-47. After the quoted passage above, "Weber added that thereafter
the people can rule and say 'to the gallows with the leader." Id. Nevertheless, We-
ber's endorsement of "leadership democracy" generated strong criticism after World
War II, particularly in Wolfgang Mommsen's charge that Weber's theory served "to
make the German people inwardly willing to acclaim Adolf Hitler's leadership posi-
tion." Id. at 144 (quoting WOLFGANG MOMMSEN, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS
1890-1920, at 410 (Michael S. Steinberg trans., 1984) (1959)). Although Weber died
in 1920, his express opposition during his lifetime to anti-Semitism and to racism, as
well as his defense of academic freedom, suggests that he would have opposed Na-
zism. See DIGGINS, supra note 21, at 271.
Nevertheless, Weber undoubtedly left some ambiguity as to the relationship be-
tween popular accountability and "leadership democracy." For example, in addition
to Article 41 enabling direct presidential elections, Weber also supported Article 48
of the Weimar constitution, which "granted the president extraordinary powers in
times of crisis," although Weber's role in relation to Article 48 is a matter of dispute
while his role in promoting Article 41 is accepted knowledge. Eliaeson, supra note
94, at 142. Though Weber himself did not expressly resolve the ambiguous relation-
ship between popular election and extraordinary presidential power, one "author
who devoted much of his thought to resolving the constitutional ambiguities that
Weber bequeathed to German posterity was Carl Schmitt." Id. at 147. Schmitt
foresaw that "Weimar parliamentarianism could not withstand" a "totalizing party"
such as the National Socialists. Id. "The presidential leader, Hindenburg, came to a
parallel conclusion, and used Article 48 to install Hitler in power. Schmitt, in short,
filled the lacunae in Weber's constitutional thinking. How Weber himself might
have filled it will," according to Eliaeson, "forever remain unclear." Id.
One final clue perhaps lies in Weber's somewhat surprising support for a "strong
parliament" as a corrective "to balance the power of the bureaucracy." Id. at 142.
Weber appears, therefore, and contrary to his own dichotomous phrasing, to have
supported both "parliamentarian democracy and plebiscitary rule." Id. at 143. The
best explanation for this, according to Eliaeson, is that Weber "envisioned balance,
much like in a monarchical system." Id.
102. See ALLEN, supra note 85, at 15-31.
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II. TALCOTT PARSONS AND "STRUCTURAL
FUNCTIONALISM"
Talcott Parsons is widely understood to have been the most
influential American sociologist of the twentieth century. 0 3 Par-
sons was also an influential advocate for Weberian theory in the
U.S. scene, translating both The Protestant Ethic and Economy
and Society into English. Parsons' advocacy included his inspi-
rations by Weber in formulating his distinctive brand of socio-
logical theory, which ultimately became known as "structural-
functionalist" theory.104 Finally, Parsons also sought to connect
some of his theoretical conclusions to U.S. foreign policy, playing
an active advisory role from the 1930s to the 1950s as the
United States developed its approach towards newly decoloniz-
ing states.
The result of these combining factors was Parsonian influ-
ence on ensuring the importance of Weberian thought in devel-
opment theory, policy, and praxis in the mid-to-late twentieth-
century United States-and also ensuring the reception of We-
berian thought in a particular form. The next sections will seek
to demonstrate how the three theoretical influences described
above arose in Parsons' own theory, and how they replicated
themselves throughout the development discourse of this era.
A. FROM "IDEAL TYPES" TO "EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS"
Parsons is often credited as being concerned above all with
building a "general" theory of social action as a foundation for
sociological analysis. Parsons' first step towards this end in his
work The Structure of Social Action.05 The first step in Parsons'
own universalist analysis, however, was an extrapolation of
"generalized"10 6 and "systematic" theoretical precepts from We-
ber's analysis of "ideal types."
Parsons was careful to establish that Weber himself shied
away from "systematic" analysis, ensuring that the systematiza-
103. PETER HAMILTON, TALco"rr PARSONS 13 (1983) ("Looking at the develop-
ment of American sociology over the past fifty years, one is immediately struck by
the scale of the contribution Talcott Parsons made .... Parsons reformulated the
nature of sociological enquiry.. . and ... gave it... a theoretical programme, which
it lacked before.").
104. Though structural-functionalism had fallen from grace by the 1970s, at its
peak the approach enjoyed widespread influence within sociological theory.
105. TALcoTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 601-04 (The Free Press
1949) (1937) [hereinafter STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION].
106. Id. at 601, 640.
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tion of Weber's analysis was identifiable as Parsons' unique im-
provement. Before setting forth a systematic theory, Parsons
devoted some time to delineating the lack of systematic analysis
in Weber, 10 7 much of which was intentional on Weber's part.
Parsons observed Weber's opposition to the idealistic or intu-
itionist strain of German theory.1 8 By contrast, Weber sought
to embrace an inductive, and ultimately empirical, approach. 9
Parsons gives a careful account of Weber's balancing of the
commitment to identifying general principles with the aware-
ness of the limitations of those principles:
A general ideal type is such a construction of a hypothetical course of
events with two other characteristics: (1) abstract generality and (2)
the ideal-typical exaggeration of empirical reality. Without the first of
these last two elements, the concept might be applicable only to a sin-
gle historical situation; without the second it might be merely a com-
mon trait or a statistical average.110
Although Weber's analysis of ideal types seemed to embody
universalizable implications, Weber himself stopped short of
making those explicit. It was left to Parsons to clarify the rela-
tionship of the "universal to the particular" in Weber's analy-
sis.1 1' In doing so, Parsons declared it "necessary, in order to
clarify the implications of his position, to go beyond Weber's own
analysis." 2
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons sought to build a
more "systematic classification of ideal types.""3 In doing so,
Parsons introduced his own "generalized theoretical account" of
society under a "structural" analysis of "systems of action" and
"systems of elements.""' Indeed, Parsons' desire to construct a
"total, general theoretical system" 5 would irritate many of his
contemporaries."' The irritation may have become further in-
107. See id. at 601-41.
108. Id. at 602.
109. Id. at 602 ("Weber throughout emphasized that scientific concepts do not
exhaust concrete reality but involve selection and are hence in this sense unreal.").
110. Id. at 605-06 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 614.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 640 (footnote omitted).
114. Id.
115. Edward C. Devereux, Jr., Parsons' Sociological Theory, in THE SOCIAL
THEORIES OF TALcOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1, 1 (Max Black ed.,
1961) ("Parsons has stood virtually alone in his concern with the construction of a
total, general theoretical system.").
116. Id. at 1. Devereux explains:
In his Dedication of The Social System, Talcott Parsons describes himself
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flamed by Parsons' own rather abstruse language," 7 requirng
several iterations both by the author himself' 18 and by commen-
tators to gel into the influential "structural-functional" socio-
logical theory of social action.
Methodologically, Parsons' "structural-functionalist" theory
straddled German and Anglo-Saxon theory,"' seeking to blend
the "analytical elegance" and dynamism of economics, with both
the concreteness of positivists and the cultural sensitivity of ide-
alists.2 Thus, Parsons sought a transhistorical, general "ana-
lytical theory" 2' of society that was both dynamic and respon-
as an incurable theorist. On this point even his severest critics would has-
ten to agree. Certainly he has done a great deal more theorizing than any
other contemporary American sociologist; and it is probably also true that
he has done rather less of anything else.
Id. The philosopher Max Black derided Parsons' theories as tending towards "apho-
risms" such as "[wihenever you do anything, you're trying to get something done."
Max Black, Some Questions About Parsons' Theories, in THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF
TALCOTT PARSONS, supra note 115, at 268, 279.
117. See Devereux, supra note 115, at 1-2 ("Parsons has been explaining his
own theories in his own words these many years, but the evidence is rather impres-
sive that he has not always succeeded in making himself understood.").
118. See Chandler Morse, The Functional Imperatives, in THE SOCIAL THEORIES
OF TALCOTr PARSONS, supra note 115, at 110, 113 ("The relation of structure to proc-
ess was far from clear in early versions of the Parsonian model. But as the model
evolved, the relationship acquired an increasingly definite form .. .
119. See Devereux, supra note 115, at 2, 4-5.
120. Parsons' goal was to combine the "analytical elegance" and the "action
frame of reference" of economists (while rejecting their focus on rationality), the fo-
cus on "physiological parameters of personality and human behavior" of the positiv-
ists (while rejecting its elements of "mechanistic determination"), and the "analysis
of cultural configurations and of the role of ideas, values, and norms" from the ideal-
ists (without the "cultural relativism which. . . blocked general theory"). Id. at 19.
121. Feraro explains the Parsonian understanding of the term:
The structural type of [conceptual] scheme specifies concepts that refer to
the types of units or parts and the relations among them that constitute
the generic structure of a category of empirical system within the scope of a
theoretical framework. The corresponding general propositions are state-
ments of uniformities in the behavior of concrete parts and relations, as
these are conceptualized. Parsons calls such general propositions empirical
generalizations. The analytical type of [conceptual] scheme specifies ana-
lytical elements or variables, the values of which characterize concrete
components of the empirical system. The corresponding general proposi-
tions are statements of uniformities in the analytical relationships among
such elements. Parsons calls them analytical laws. An analytical theory,
finally, is a system of analytical laws. One important implication of these
distinctions is that the formulation of an analytical theory must be based
upon an accompanying structural type of conceptual scheme as well as an
analytical type. The reason for this is that an analytical law presupposes
elements that characterize the various components or concrete entities
comprising an empirical system and these components have to be concep-
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sive to culture.
Within this structural account, Parsons emphasized the im-
portance of methodological dynamism, as expressed on two dif-
ferent levels: first, the fundamental unit of analysis was the
"unit act,"122 and the sociological theory itself was a theory of so-
cial action."2 Second, Parsons embraced a "voluntaristic theory
of action," which assumed a critical role of agency in determin-
ing how individuals committed "unit acts" against the complex
backdrop of his structural-functional analytical framework.
24
Parsons posited that social action occurred against a back-
drop of structural, universal features of the social system.12 5 The
three fundamental structural sub-systems were: "the personal-
ity systems of... individualized actors";126  the differentiation
and organization of social role;' and "the culture system."128 Of
tualized in structural terms (i.e., in terms of ideas about the types of con-
crete units and their relations). It is because of this methodological impli-
cation that Parsons exerts so much effort in his early work to provide a
general conception of the structure of empirical social action systems that
can become the basis for a later analytical sociological theory of these sys-
tems.
THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS: FOUNDATION AND SYNTHESIS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 82 (2001).
122. Id. at 88-93. The "unit act" was defined to include the following elements:
(1) an actor; (2) an "end" (that is, "a future state of affairs toward which the process
of action is oriented"; (3) a situation "differing from that to which action is oriented
(the end) and including two elements, those which cannot be altered by the actor-
conditions-and those which he can control-means"; and (4) a "specific mode of re-
lationship between the elements of the unit act, so that 'in the choice of alterative
means to the end insofar as the situation allows alternatives, here is a 'normative
orientation' of action.'" PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 70 (1983) (quoting
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105, at 44); see also FARARO, supra note
121, at 88-93.
123. See, e.g., STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105; PARSONS ET AL.,
WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION (1953).
124. See STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105; PARSONS, THE SOCIAL
SYSTEM (1951) [hereinafter SOCIAL SYSTEM]; FARARO, supra note 121.
125. See Devereux, supra note 115, at 53 ("Structure, as Parsons sees it, repre-
sents at best a convenient way of codifying and talking about certain apparent con-
sistencies in social phenomena .... [But in order to avoid reification we must em-
ploy the] conception of dynamic equilibrium.").
126. See Morse, supra note 118, at 105 ("[Tlhe personality systems of... indi-
vidual actors, consisting of internalized 'need dispositions' and therefore of potential
'motivational commitments' to various types of goals and to various patterns of be-
havior. .. ").
127. See id. ("The social system, or structure of social organization, consisting of
defined roles and their associated and institutionalized (=internalized and shared)
role-expectations (= 'expected performances' and 'sanctions').. ").
128. See id. ("[Tihe culture system, consisting of the heritage of knowledge, be-
liefs, ideas, technologies, mores, customs, habits, laws, values, standards, norms,
together with the symbols, both tangible (artifacts) and intangible (language, the
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these three interdependent sub-systems, Parsons saw culture as
the most dispositive 9
In The Social System... and Toward a General Theory of Ac-
tion,3' Parsons developed the "functionalist" side of his method-
ology. In addition to taking place against this structural back-
drop, he now asserted, social action was directed by a set of four
"functional imperatives, or 'problems' which must be met ade-
quately if equilibrium and/or continuing existence of the system
is to be maintained."'32 The four problems are those of: (1) Goal
Attainment, or "keeping the action system moving steadily to-
ward its goals"; (2) Adaptation, or "properly perceiving and ra-
tionally manipulating the object world for the attainment of
ends"; (3) Integration, or "holding cooperating units in line, of
creating and maintaining 'solidarity,' despite the emotional
strains involved in the process of goal attainment"; and (4) La-
tency, or ensuring that "units have the time and the facilities,
within a suitable conditioning environment, to constitute or re-
constitute the capacities needed by the system."33
These imperative problems at the societal level create social
sub-systems, each to address the respective basic functional im-
perative: for example, Goal Attainment manifests in the politi-
cal system; Adaptation manifests in the economic system.
Each sub-system can be analyzed further in terms of these func-
tional imperatives: for example, the economy can be analyzed in
terms of Goal Attainment (the "Production sub-system"), Adap-
tation (the "Investment capitalization sub-system"), Integration
(the "Entrepreneurial sub-system"), and Latency (the "Economic
commitments sub-system").' 3'
Social action was determined within the structural frame-
work of personality-social role-culture and driven by the func-
tional imperatives of goal attainment-adaptation-integration-
latency. Parsons' last major theoretical contribution was to
posit that social action was additionally mediated according to a
set of five fundamental "pattern variables" for interpreting the
arts) that represent them.").
129. See id. ("No one of these systems is entirely independent of the others. The
culture system is the major binding element.").
130. See SOCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 124.
131. TALCOTT PARSONS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION (Talcott Par-
sons & Edward A. Schils eds., 1951).
132. See Morse, supra note 118, at 113.
133. See id. at 113-14.
134. See id. at 121-22.
135. See id. at 140-41.
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social situation, mediating potentially conflicting concepts, and
producing the ultimate social orientation in which action oc-
curred. 1
36
The functional imperatives are transhistorical and univer-
sal, and the social response to them is evolutionary in nature:
societies evolve towards ever-higher levels of structural "differ-
entiation" in the management of social roles.137 Although Par-
sons' theory was universalist in that it posited that all societies
would traverse roughly the same set of structural-functional
changes, this progress was far from inevitable. In fact, societies
could fail to progress if their cultures did not adapt sufficiently
to environmental conditions: 38 the term "evolution" implies a
race for survival of the fittest among societies and cultures.
Hence Parsons' theory of "evolutionary universals": adaptations
136. See Devereux, supra note 115, at 38-42. The framework for structural
analysis is comprised of the pattern variables, guided by three principal criteria:
First, the variables should be completely general and permit comparisons
between groups of any sort whatever and across cultures .... Second, the
variables should be relevant for the action frame of references .... Finally,
the variables should be relevant for the analysis of the functional problems
about which system differentiation takes place .... The outcome of Par-
sons' thinking about these matters was the now-famous set of pattern vari-
ables .... These were a set of five dichotomous variables conceived as con-
stituting universal and basic dilemmas confronting any actor in any social
situation. Parsons argued that each variable represented a fundamental
problem of orientation which the actor would somehow have to resolve ei-
ther one way or the other; moreover, he would have to come to terms with
all five before arriving at any determinate orientation .... 1. Affectivity
[e.g. marital bond] -Affective neutrality [e.g. customer bond] .... ;
2.Specificity [customer] -Diffuseness [marital] .... ; 3. Universalism [cogni-
tive]-Particularism [cathectic] .... ; 4. Quality-Performance .... ; 5. Self-
orientation-collectivity-orientation ....
Id. (emphasis omitted).
137. See Morse, supra note 118, at 143. Morse explains:
These four functional problems represent four distinct (yet interdependent)
social 'ends,' and constitute the basis of four corresponding rationalities,
the simultaneous application of which is responsible for the ways in which
social systems function. Within a rather undifferentiated social system,
such as a primitive family or tribe, consistency among the four rationalities
and their application is achieved by the institutionalization of role patterns
together with the opportunity for adjustment by direct settlement of con-
flicts .... When a society becomes highly differentiated... the possibilities
of inconsistency become far more numerous .... The degree of consistency
achieved is a determinant of the stability or instability of the system, any
inconsistency among the four types of rationality or their application being
a particularly important source of conflict and, potentially, of change.
Id.
138. Jackson Toby, Introductory Chapter of TALCOTT PARSONS, THE EVOLUTION
OF SOCIETIES 1, 20 (Jackson Toby ed., 1977).
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are universally required in order for societies to progress to
modernity. 9
This neo-Darwinian (or more accurately, neo-Spencerian) 140
perspective also implied the urgency of policy intervention for
those societies that had to date failed to produce the requisite
cultural change for economic development. As one Parsonian
remarked, "[t]here ought to be interest also in the application of
evolutionary theory to the practical problem of modernization:
without economic and social development some considerable
proportion of the.., persons on the planet have a bleak fu-
ture."'
Parsons' reading of Weber's The Protestant Ethic through
his own structural-functionalist lens helped him to conclude
from this theory that "American society constituted an evolu-
tionary breakthrough; it displayed a higher level of organized
complexity than any other." 42 It was at this stage that Parsons'
methodology reached its zenith, disseminating through Par-
sons-trained academic appointees to the rapidly expanding field
of sociology from the 1930s to the 1960s.
44
In one highly influential application of the pattern variable
analysis, Parsons, working with his frequent collaborator Ed-
ward Shils, further streamlined the "pattern variables" into a
general division between "traditional" and "modern" society.1
The dualistic distinction between tradition, on the one hand,
and modernity, on the other, would be picked up by W.W.
Rostow 146 and employed generally in the development policy of
the time. Thus, Parsons' work helped to establish the ground-
work for modernization theory. In his drive to develop a univer-
salistic account of economic growth and its relationship to gov-
ernance, however, Parsons explicitly elided those aspects of
139. See id. at 10-20
140. For a discussion of Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism, see Chantal
Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1451 (2000).
141. Toby, supra note 138, at 20.
142. See Frank J. Lechner, Talcott Parsons, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION
AND SOCIETY (William H. Swatos ed., 1998).
143. See HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 28 ("The influence exerted by Parsons'
theoretical work over American sociology... cannot be overestimated. Within the
general context of sociological orthodoxy at the time, normally referred to as struc-
tural-functionalism, Parsons reigned supreme.").
144. See id.
145. See generally TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION, supra note 131.
146. Walt Whitman Rostow, Toward a General Theory of Action, 5 WORLD POL.
530, 530 (1953) (reviewing TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION, supra note 131).
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Weber that contradicted this objective. 147
Parsons believed that his general theory essentially ex-
tended and perfected the insights of Weber's theory of ideal
types. Parsons asserts that "if Weber had developed such a sys-
tematized general theory, 'he could hardly have failed' to realize
that functionalism represents the most viable approach."'
4 8
Subsequently, however, New Weberians have demonstrated the
ways in which Parsonian universalism not only misapplied We-
ber's typology but, more seriously, misunderstood Weber's over-
arching project. In Deparsonizing Weber, for example, Cohen et
al. strongly opposed Parsons' reading of Weber as a nascent
functionalist, arguing that Weber himself "rejected functional-
ism." 14 They argued that Parsons dramatically simplified We-
ber's analysis and criticized Parsons for treating a factor as "de-
cisive rather than.., one of several important
considerations." 0 This simplification formed the ground floor in
the one size fits all edifice.
B. THE DETERMINISM OF "VALUES" IN MODERNIZATION
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons argued that We-
ber and other prominent social theorists had converged on the
centrality of "cultural norms and beliefs-in other words, val-
ues" as an explanation for social action."' While the "conditions
of action" and other environmental factors played an important
role in determining social evolution, culture was the ultimate
1b2
cause.
147. See STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105, at v-vi. In the intro-
duction to The Structure of Social Action, Parsons notes that his study is not inter-
ested in "the separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of" the au-
thors he considers-primarily Weber, Durkheim, Alfred Marshall, and Vilfred
Pareto--but in "a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning the development of
which can be traced through a critical analysis of the writings of this group, and of
certain of their predecessors." Id. at v (emphasis omitted). This amounts to an ad-
mission that these writers are being read for the ways in which they support a the-
ory that Parsons himself wishes to develop.
148. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 230 (quoting Talcott Parsons, Introduction to
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 29 (Talcott Par-
sons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947)) (emphasis added by
Cohen et al.).
149. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 230.
150. Id.
151. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 74.
152. Toby, supra note 138, at 8. "[These other factors] do not thereby give direc-
tion to change; direction is given by cultural values." Id. Thus, for example, "Par-
sons explains the ultimate failure of the Roman Empire in terms of the inability 'to
develop a dynamic religious system which could legitimate and strengthen the
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Defenders of Parsons were careful to point out that Parsons'
structural-functionalist theory did not focus on beliefs to the ex-
clusion of other factors. 53 Yet Parsons himself described his
work as "culturally determinist."154 Although the "institutionali-
zation of values" was "a contingent process," the "normative pat-
tern" of those values provided "a society its identity" as the "sin-
gle most important functional[ist] facet." "' As Parsons argued,
the "concept of values provides the focal center for analyzing the
organization of [social] systems, of societies and of personali-
ties."56 It was Parsons' theory that influenced writers such as
David McLelland to focus on the "achievement motive" in cul-
ture as an explanation for effective social adaptation."' Parsons'
theory of culture and social change also posited a universalistic
theory of societal evolution in a "sequence of stages" 158 -a char-
acteristic that would surface fully in one of Parsons' most impor-
tant intellectual heirs, W.W. Rostow.
Parsons' belief in the centrality of cultural beliefs and val-
ues as an explanatory factor for social change overstated the
role of culture as articulated by Weber. Certainly, Weber saw
himself and his work as opposed to the economic determinism of
what is sometimes termed "vulgar" Marxism.9 At the same
time, however, New Weberian scholars have emphasized that
Weber also accepted much of the fundamental wisdom of Marx's
approach. That is to say, Weber's theory both diverged and con-
verged with Marxian analysis.
160
enormously expanded societal community.'" Id. at 9 (citing TALcOrr PARSONS,
SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 92 (1966)).
153. See id. ("[Parsons] does not mean that cultural developments are the only
or even the main source of social change."). Toby specifically distinguished Parsons'
cultural determinism from the more exclusively cultural explanations of theorists
such as Ruth Benedict. See id. at 9; see generally RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF
CULTURE (1934).
154. PARSONS, supra note 152, at 113.
155. Lechner, supra note 142, at 353.
156. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 82.
157. See generally DAVID MCLELLAND ET AL., THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE (1951).
158. Toby, supra note 138, at 20.
159. See Guenther Roth, Global Capitalism and Multi-Ethnicity: Max Weber
Then and Now, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER, supra note 1, at 117, 118.
Roth explains:
Weber disclaimed an 'inner sympathy" with capitalism, as against the
champions of older laissez-faire doctrines, he defended, as a "rather pure
bourgeois," the imperatives of the capitalistic market place against its
many detractors from the right and left.
Id.
160. See ALLEN, supra note 85, at 26-30; FRANK PARKIN, MAX WEBER 94-95,
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The clearest example of Weber's careful blending of histori-
cal materialist insights with his own analysis might be his well-
known statement that "very frequently the 'world images' that
have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined
the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic
of interest."16' Weber posits that ideals form channels of dis-
course through which social change is driven by material inter-
ests: the image is one of indelible interaction between ideal and
material factors, rather than of the lone importance of ideals.
Rather than emphasizing the exclusive role of "values" as
engendering capitalistic growth, Weber is proposing a much
more specific role of "ideals." In analytical terms, the statement
sees ideals as necessary but not sufficient to effect historical
change. The "dynamic of interest" pushes social activity along
one "ideals" track over another. Without this dynamic of inter-
est, therefore, ideals could not take hold and flourish. At the
same time, this statement tells us, ideals ultimately play the
shaping role, the mold into which underling interests drive so-
cial action.
Thus, Weber states that "not ideas, but material and ideal
interests, directly govern men's conduct."'62 Weber sought to ex-
plain the important role that norms play in shaping behavior,
resisting an explanation of social action that looked solely to the
structure of the economic "means of production." Weber's un-
derstanding of norms seemed imbued by a distinctly dimmer
mood than that of Parsons. Weber explicitly recognized the
subordinating role that norms could play in effectuating the
domination of members of society to the ruling elite. 63 Indeed,
in this conceptual interrelationship between dominant norms
and material interests, Weber's theory might be read against
the work of subsequent critical theorists in a new light. For
present purposes the main point is that Weber's theory viewed
material interests as a centrally important factor, interacting
with "ideal interests" and driving social action along the "tracks"
laid by those ideal interests to shape history.
By contrast, New Weberian scholars have pointed out that
Parsons drained much of the influence of the non-normative
from Weber's theory. Cohen et al. argue that, "[iln attempting
to assimilate Weber's formulations of his own version of action
104 (1982).
161. ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 60, at 280.
162. Id.
163. See infra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
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theory, Parsons asserted that a 'focus of interest on the norma-
tive aspects of action systems' was basic to Weber's scheme ....
According to Parsons,... 'there is no such thing as action except
as effort to conform with norms.'" 64
Thus, while Parsons argued correctly that Weber focused on
the normative aspects of action, he exaggerated by asserting
that norms are central to Weber's conception of social action.
On issues where Weber made no mention of norms or explicitly
denied their importance, Parsons claimed (to the contrary) that
norms were important to Weber. When Weber stated that
norms were of varying importance, Parsons asserted their cen-
tral importance. When Weber nominated other factors as being
primary, Parsons elevated norms to a position of centrality and
deemphasized nonnormative factors. The consequence is that
Weber's conception of action theory was distorted.''
The New Weberians suggest, by contrast, that in Weber's
analysis, self-conscious value-orientation is only one type of so-
cial action. 66  Moreover, Weber felt that value-rational action
was both potentially antagonistic to, and constrained by, the in-
strumentalities of modem statehood.
167
How does Weber's analysis of the Protestant ethic in driving
164. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 231 (emphasis added in the original) (citations
omitted).
165. See id. at 231. Cohen et al. state that:
According to Weber... [aiction may be determined on instrumentally ra-
tional, value-rational, affectual or traditional grounds. That is, the actor's
orientation may be determined principally by his "expectations as to the
behavior of objects.., and of other human beings," by his conscious belief
in [a] value for its own sake," by his 'specific affects and feeling states," or
by "ingrained habituation." Weber also noted three types of subjective
meaning common in social action: usage, custom and complex interests.
That is, an action may be performed repeatedly because of current use, be-
cause of long familiarity, or because of stable opportunities for realizing in-
terests.
Parsons perceived all three of these types of subjective meaning as essen-
tially normative. In addition, he viewed as essentially normative three of
the four categories for orientating action: traditionalism, instrumentally
rational action and value-rational action .... However, a category-by-
category analysis shows that traditional behavior, usages and customs are
primarily habitual, while instrumentally rational behavior and complexes
of interests are largely orientated to expediency rather than to norms.
Only value-rational behavior is primarily normative in any of the senses
intended by Parsons.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. See ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 24-25 (describing four types of
social action: value-rational, instrumentally-rational, affectual, and traditional).
167. See id. at 25.
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capitalism, a striking example of value-rational conduct, mesh
with this analysis of the types of social action? The value-
rational conduct that gave rise to effective capitalistic conduct
would, like all other types of religiously motivated behavior,
come to be constrained by the very state and society that arose
initially out of that behavior.' This was one of the paradoxes
that Weber underscored: the way in which the very religious
values which initiated modern activity-industry in the eco-
nomic sphere, scientific inquiry, and even the rule of law-
would ultimately create institutions that would destabilize the
values that birthed them. This destabilization of values was
what Weber called the "disenchantment" of modem society, de-
scribed above. 69  Given Weber's attention to disenchantment
from value-rational action, Parsons' interpretation of this typol-
ogy of social action as value-driven is curious. This emphatic fo-
cus on ideals seems to be inspired more by the Protestant Ethic
than by the source of the typology itself, Economy and Society.
The rather exclusive attention to ideals also manifested it-
self in Parsons' analytical distance from material conditions as
causes of social action and determinants of social relations. We-
ber, by contrast, specifically warned that his intention was not
"to substitute for a one-sided causal materialistic an equally
one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of
history."7 ° Cohen et al. observed that "[w]hile we cannot be cer-
tain whether Parsons misunderstood the target of Weber's cri-
tique of 'Marxian historical materialism,' he clearly missed its
substantive point. Weber quite clearly retained the interest
category (including material interest) as a central motive for ac-
tion and as an important social force." 171 Weber rejected only
those accounts which gave exclusive attention to material inter-
ests, but still viewed material interests as centrally important.7 2
In particular, the excision of "non-normative" or material
interests in Weber served to underscore and possibly to distort
Weber's discussion of the role of Protestant "values" in produc-
ing capitalistic behavior. Whereas Weber sought to describe
168. See DIGGINS, supra note 21, at 26 ("From the 'simple people' of rural Amer-
ica Weber would develop a theory of capitalism seen as a sociological phenomenon
springing originally from religious convictions, which would eventually give way to
secularization as the entrepreneur continued to demonstrate his qualifications as a
Christian by his business integrity.").
169. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
170. PROTESTANT ETHIc, supra note 9, at 183.
171. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 236.
172. Id.
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Protestantism as one particular historical source of a more gen-
eral phenomenon, the Parsonian approach tends to cut away
and deemphasize this historical and analytical complexity.
Combined with Parsons' attraction to universalistic and pre-
scriptive analysis, this approach can end up simplifying Weber's
thesis into the proposition that Protestant values not only
helped generate capitalistic behavior, but that they are actually
"necessary" for capitalism to take root as a general matter. This
proposition in turn generates the corollary that cultural values
in beliefs have independently driven social change not only in
the case of Western capitalism, but explain more generally the
success or lack thereof of capitalistic enterprise in non-Western
societies. Thus Cohen et al. could conclude: "For Parsons, revo-
lutions in consciousness, not the inexorable unfolding of techno-
logical power or the contradictions of class society, provided the
critical turning points in history."
13
An endorsement of capitalistic and scientific values from a
normative perspective was part of Parsons' self-conscious un-
derstanding of the intention behind his work. In his introduc-
tory description of the objectives of setting out a systematic the-
ory of social action, Parsons made clear that the focus of this
theory was "the interpretation ... of 'capitalism,' 'free enter-
prise,' 'economic individualism,' as it has been variously
called." 74 Parsons was partially motivated by a special plea di-
rectly from Friedrich von Hayek, who saw Weber as an "ideo-
logical forerunner" for a theory of economic growth that es-
chewed "public regulation" suggested by Marxian and
Keynesian policies.
Just as the argument for deregulatory politics served as an
important and explicit counterpoint to advocates for socialist
statist policy, Parsons' argument for the importance of beliefs
served as an important and explicit counterpoint to proponents
of the view that the primary deficit in the developing world was
the absence of capital. The latter formed an important part of
dependency theory, which argued that colonizing countries had
extracted capital from colonies in addition to establishing mar-
ket patterns that created economic dependency of the peripheral
173. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 93.
174. STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105, at vi.
175. ALLEN, supra note 85, at 7 (citing Talcott Parsons, The Circumstances of
My Encounter with Max Weber, in SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITIONS FROM GENERATION TO
GENERATION (Robert K Merton & Matilda White Riley eds., 1980)).
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colonies on the metropolitan center. 76
Streamlined in the service of a particularly American ver-
sion of capitalism, Weber's analysis was stripped of insights that
in fact might have predicted many of the lessons that were
learned the hard way from the application of the "evolutionary
universals" model that developed. The desire to create a viable
and clearly opposed alternative to socialism in the cold war era
likely inspired Parsons and others simply to elide and underplay
the role that material dynamics played in Weber's own theory.
Again, the solution threw the baby out with the bathwater: by
gravitating towards an idealist explanation for capitalist devel-
opment, the Parsonians set themselves up for policies that were
not only misguided but ineffective.
C. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND
DEMOCRACY
Parsons argued that the "necessary breakthroughs" for
modernization included the contemporaneous rise of capitalism
and democracy: "the institutionalization of the authority of of-
fice, the use of market mechanisms for mobilizing resources, a
generalized legal order, and the democratic association."77 Par-
sons did not devote much attention to exactly how democracy
would arise or how it would operate. Rather, Parsons assumed a
naturalistic relationship between modernization and democ-
racy-as the former emerged, the latter would naturally take
root. In his 1964 essay, Evolutionary Universals in Society, Par-
sons explicitly applied evolutionary theory to identify central-
ized political legitimacy, the emergence of political rationaliza-
tion through bureaucracy, and "the democratic association with
elective leadership and fully enfranchised membership" as natu-
rally co-evolving hallmarks of modernity.
178
The casual assertion of the link between modern bureauc-
racy, capitalism, and democracy may have stemmed from the
fact that Parsons did not analyze the role of power in his list of
functional imperatives.'79 Rather, Parsons expressed a highly
176. See ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE
UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY (Pluto Press 1971). For an explicit denuncia-
tion of Parsonian methodology, see id.
177. Toby, supra note 138, at 12-13.
178. Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29 AM. SOC. REV. 339,
353, 355 (1964).
179. See Morse, supra note 118, at 151. Morse notes:
Had he regarded power in this way, Parsons might have seen that effective
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idealized version of the actual functioning and social role of the
institutions of political democracy such as the electoral fran-
chise. 8 ° This was consistent with his orientation in terms of po-
litical and economic theory, and with his objective of counteract-
ing oppositional theories then competing for allegiance in the
realm of international economic policy.' Thus, "pessimism was
the aspect of Weber's thought that ... Parsons had labored so
hard to downplay in Toward a Theory of Social Action."'82
Whereas Weber viewed the establishment of modern capitalistic
bureaucracy with "despair,' 1 3 Parsons seemed to see it from a
much more optimistic vantage point as a necessary outcome of
desirable evolutionary progression in society.
Although Parsons recognized power as a factor in Weber's
analysis,' 8 ' he nevertheless underplayed that aspect in multiple
ways. The first was through his own selective culling of Weber's
theoretical concepts. As Cohen et al. observed, Parsonian theory
holds that "common values are the sine qua non of the social or-
der."80 Parsons' reading of Weber not only emphasized norma-
tive interests driving individual activity at the expense of inter-
nally identified non-normative factors such as material interest,
as discussed above, but also emphasized those normative inter-
ests at the expense of externally determined non-normative fac-
tors, such as coercion: "Parsons' great stress on the alleged im-
portance of the 'common value' in Weber's work forced a
fundamental reordering of Weberian perspectives on the signifi-
cance of ideas and interests in social action, and eventually re-
sulted in misinterpretation of Weber's perspective on domina-
tion."8 6
The Structure of Social Action accomplishes this re-ordering
social goals are of necessity those that are desirable from the standpoint of
the powerful. This might have led him to [investigate the] hierarchical
definition and enforcement of social goals[.]
Id.
180. See Andrew Hacker, Sociology and Ideology, in THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF
TALCOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 115, at 289, 298-301.
181. See id. at 290-91. Hacker notes that although Parsons' "'conservative' bias"
has been oft remarked on, it is actually more of a classical liberalism: "it is the ideol-
ogy of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, the ideology of political liberty and a free
society." Id. at 291.
182. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 55.
183. See Max Weber on Bureaucracy, supra note 68.
184. STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 105, at 658, 717; Talcott Par-
sons, Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis, 4 REv. POL. 62 (1942).
185. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 236.
186. Id.
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partially through omission. Most of Parsons' treatment of We-
ber focuses on his sociology of religion, lending force to the col-
lective-value, normative analysis. Only a small portion of Struc-
ture of Social Action focuses on Weber's treatment of power. Yet
power ultimately played a central role in Weber's analysis of
modern governance. As noted above, Weber's theory was in-
flected by a Nietzschean sensitivity to "structures of domi-
nancy."17 New Weberians Kieran Allen and Cohen et al. have
argued that a "correct understanding of Weber's general sociol-
ogy is impossible unless founded on a faithful reading of this
theory of' power.'8 8
This bowdlerizing tendency in Parsons' reception of Webe-
rian analysis was perhaps most famously displayed in his trans-
lation of Weber's ideal types of governance, or Herrschaft.' The
term forms the basis for Weber's classic and perhaps best known
analysis: his formulation of the ideal types in social structures
as deriving from forms of power or Herrschaft that are "tradi-
tional," "charismatic" or "formal-rational" in nature.' 90
The plain, unvarnished definitions of Herrschaft in contem-
porary German-English dictionaries-as "rule" or "dominion" -
seem to capture the term's blending of coercion by the elite to-
gether with some basic level of acceptance, if not full consent, by
the masses. '91 On the other hand, English translations of We-
ber's Economy and Society have tended to err on the side of ei-
ther coercion or consent, construing Herrschaft as "authority,"
which highlights consent, or "domination," which highlights co-
ercion. Guenther Roth, in his translation of Economy and Soci-
ety, chose to translate Herrschaft as "legitimate domination."'92
Roth's translation mirrored that of Reinhard Bendix, who in his
book of Max Weber explicitly discussed the difficulty of translat-
ing Herrschaft, and preferred the term "legitimate domina-
tion."9 3
187. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 941. See Lassman, supra note 1,
at 83.
188. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 237; see also Allen, supra note 85, at 15-32.
189. See infra notes 198-214.
190. See Guenther Roth, Introduction to ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8,
at lxxxviii.
191. The Cambridge Klett Comprehensive German Dictionary defines Herr-
schaft as "power, rule, reign." CAMBRIDGE KLETT COMPREHENSIVE GERMAN
DICTIONARY 381 (2003). Similarly, Langenscheidts Taschenworterbuch Englisch de-
fines Herrschaft as "rule, dominion (iber); mastery, power, control."
LANGENSCHEIDTS TASCHENWORTERBUCH ENGLISCH 927 (1956).
192. See Roth, supra note 190, at lxxxviii.
193. Bendix, supra note 12, at 481. In his section on Legal Domination, Bendix
[Vol. 15:2
WEBER, PARSONS AND LEGAL REFORM
Parsons, however, preferred the term "leadership."' 9' Par-
sons' rendition of Herrschaft, therefore, plays up the "consent"
side of the term even more than the word "authority." In a re-
view of Bendix's "intellectual portrait" of Weber, Parsons ex-
plained:
The term [Herrschaft], which in its most general meaning I should now
translate as "leadership," implies that a leader has power over his fol-
lowers. But "domination" suggests that this fact, rather than the inte-
gration of the collectivity, in the interest of effective functioning.. . is
the critical factor from Weber's point of view .... The former interpre-
tation [does not represent] the main trend of Weber's thought, though
he was in certain respects a 'realist' in the analysis of power. The
preferable interpretation ... is represented especially by his tremen-
dous emphasis on the importance of legitimation ... legitime Herr-
schaft [was] for Weber... overwhelmingly the most significant195
case ....
Thus, Parsons endorsed "leadership" as the most preferable
translation of Herrschaft. The New Weberians have explored at
length the difficulties of translating Weber's Herrschaft into
English. In particular, Cohen et al. devoted extensive discus-
sion to Parsons' misuse of the term. Cohen et al. dispute that
Weber's "prime emphasis was on either (1) leadership in the in-
terest of effective collectivity functioning or (2) legitimation."96
begins with a footnote describing the difficulties of translating Weber's term Herr-
schaft:
It is difficult to find an English equivalent for the German term Herrschaft,
which emphasizes equally the ruler's exercise of power and the follower's
acceptance of that exercise as legitimate, a meaning which goes back to the
relations between lord and vassal under feudalism. The English terms
"domination" and "authority" are not equally apt, because the first empha-
sizes the power of command whether or not consent is present, while the
second emphasizes the right of command and hence implies the follower's
acceptance almost to the exclusion of the ruler's very real power. Weber
wished to emphasize that both power and consent are problematic, but as a
realist in the analysis of power he would have been critical of any transla-
tion that tended to obscure the 'threat of force' present in all relations be-
tween superiors and subordinates. For these reasons, I prefer the term
'domination.'
Id. Bendix puts his finger on a difficulty of translation in Weber's concept subtly
blending-and conceptually requiring-both the notion of coercion and the notion of
consent. Id. When unpacked in this way, the seemingly intended meaning of the
term Herrschaft remarkably comes within striking distance of Antonio Gramsci's
concept of hegemony. Indeed, some Frankfurt School scholars would employ Webe-
rian concepts in their critiques of modern society.
194. See infra note 205.
195. Talcott Parsons, Reinhard Bendix's Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 25
AM. Soc. REV. 750 (1960) (book review).
196. Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 237.
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Rather, Cohen et al. argue that "Weber did not suggest that
dominant persons act to integrate collectivities in the interest of
effective functioning. Rather, he treated such individuals as
acting in terms of their own ideal and material interests as they
perceive them."97
Moreover, Cohen et al. found Parsons' emphasis on legiti-
mation as "no more convincing than Parsons' related attempt
[concerning] leadership." 19 Cohen et al. argue that, whereas
Parsons emphasized the importance of "belief in legitimacy" in
explaining the basis of power in social structures, Weber al-
lowed that Herrschaft could be based in "physical coercion; ha-
bituation to which at least under certain conditions Weber ap-
plied the label 'discipline'; rational calculation of interests, a
specific version of which is founded in relationships of expertise;
and belief in the legitimacy of perceived order." 99 Thus, Weber
wrote:
It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in
positions of power is primarily for (or even at all) oriented to this belief
[in legitimacy]. Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals
or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in
practice for reasons of material interest. Or people may submit from
individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable
alternative.
2 0 0
Weber's view of Herrschaft thus appeared to contain much
more normative complexity than the term "leadership" connotes.
As subsequent New Weberians have pointed out, these difficul-
ties in translation probably have had at least as much to do with
the Anglo-American tradition of political thought as with lin-
guistics. While Cohen et al. critique the lack of attention to
"nonlegitimate" rule in Weber's thought, at least as problematic
was the understanding of the term "legitimate" itself. Weber's
understanding of the term appears to have been strictly positiv-
ist, referring to the actual willingness of subjects to obey author-
ity rather than to any normatively valid basis for their obedi-
ence. "Weber's uncanny ability to equate authority with power
flew in the face of the more optimistic outlook of western politi-
cal philosophy which assumed that the Enlightenment's legacy
had resolved the problem by defining all legitimate authority as
197. Id. at 238.
198. Id.
199. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 53-54, 212-14, 942-46.
200. Id. at 214.
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deriving from voluntary consent. " '
Lassman elaborates on Weber's understanding of legitima-
tion, arguing that it was "not concerned with the normative
question of whether or not that body of rules ought to be consid-
ered legitimate."2 °2 This approach was shaped by Weber's meth-
odological affinity both with "legal positivism and post-
Nietzschean skepticism."2 °3 Eliaeson further explores the differ-
ence between Anglo-American political thought and Weber's
post-Nietzschean, anti-Hegelian approach:
For an Anglo-American ... [Iliberalism means 'freedoms," enshrined
politically as rights and protected by various institutional methods
which limit state authority .... The core problem of liberalism is state
power: limiting it, controlling, or alternatively of justifying its political
role which is to be determined by constitutions and by democracy or
more broadly by consent arising through discussion. Weber, however,
was far removed from all of this. He had no sentimental attachment to
either democracy or parliamentary forms. 'Rights' barely exist as a
concept in his texts, and when they appear they do so as a valuable
residue of past fanaticism .... Indeed, he showed little affinity even
with German liberalism, which made its own distinctive contribution
to the liberal tradition with the idea of Rechtsstaat, the ideal of a state
of laws not of men... Weber hardly used the word Rechtsstaat. The
explanation for this is that the word itself has natural-law connota-
tions. And natural law was alien to Weber, who was very pronounced
in favor of what we might call legal positivism-or, maybe better, legal
realism, since there were lingering elements of natural law in the legal
positivism of his day 
....
In sum, Weber's view of Herrschaft reflected much greater
ambivalence about the role of power in securing governmental
authority. This view was in turn likely shaped by the post-
Nietzschean philosophical tradition out of which Weber wrote.
201. DIGGINS, supra note 21, at 62.
202. See Lassman, supra note 1, at 87. Lassman notes:
This is a point where many of Weber's critics argue that he has unjustifia-
bly altered the generally accepted meaning of the concept. Weber ignores
the argument that a concept such as "legitimate" has implicit normative
implications and cannot, therefore, be used in a 'neutral" manner. Accord-
ing to Weber's critics to describe a regime as legitimate must be to refer to
a valued achievement other than the contingent fact that its citizens ap-
pear to obey its laws or just happen to believe it to be legitimate.
Id.
203. See id. at 87-88. Lassman continues: 'Weber was, in many ways, influ-
enced by both legal positivism and post-Nietzschean skepticism. He was not con-
cerned with the problem of which regimes are normatively legitimate, but with a
different question:... 'how can modern regimes legitimate themselves or be held to
be legitimate?'" Id. at 88.
204. Eliaeson, supra note 94, at 136-37.
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Parsons, in attempting to transpose Weberian concepts for an
American audience, may also have altered them to reflect the
different philosophical climate of American social and political
thought. The consequence, however, may have been to obscure
some important implications of Weber's writings regarding the
likely consequences of legal reform efforts.
D. PARSONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
[The] confluence of U.S. foreign policy needs and the ambitions of Par-
sons and his collaborators would provide the foundation for a social
scientific theory of social change ... Parsonian theory would provide a
basis for uniting the particularistic studies being made in Area Studies•. , 205
programs into a single, coordinated research and policy agenda.
In formulating that agenda, Parsons was particularly moti-
vated by the desire to provide an "American alternative to
Marxism," as his theory would subsequently come to be called. 6
In this cold war context, Parsons sought to portray Weber-and
his theories about capitalism as interpreted by Parsons-as
"above political conflicts."2 7
Parsons explicitly situated his analytical framework of evo-
lutionary universals in the policy divide between capitalism and
socialism. The notion that the major engine of growth and de-
velopment lay in the "beliefs" of members of society found im-
portant support in Max Weber's exposition of the role of Protes-
tant ideals in spurring capitalist development in Western
Europe.
Parsons was motivated to establish the universality of his
theory at least in part out of the same concerns that animated
his endorsement of normative factors, namely a desire to ex-
clude and delegitimate rival Marxian accounts of economic
growth. In fact, Parsons declared "special reasons" for down-
playing the role of nonnormative interests, and underplaying
the problematic conceptual role of democracy, in his reading of
Weber.2 " These reasons also related to his desire to deprivilege
and delegitimate rival accounts.0 9 In particular, excising We-
205. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 73.
206. ALLEN, supra note 85, at 7 (citing ALVIN WARD GOULDNER, THE COMING
CRISIS IN WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 177 (1970)).
207. Id. ("Weber thus entered the canon of American sociology as a 'value free'
sociologist.").
208. See Talcott Parsons, On 'De-Parsonizing Weber," 40 AM. SOC. REV. 666, 668
(1975).
209. See id. at 666 (seeking to "clarify... the relation between economic theory
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ber's sociocultural "pessimism" from his own theory allowed
Parsons to "craft a Weberian theory that permitted [the] image
of American modernity as a wonderful thing."
210
Parsons sought not only to emphasize the importance of
capitalist beliefs, but also to situate this causal variable in a
universalist analysis of economic growth and social change.
Central tenets of modernization theory were that: (1) there is a
universal path towards economic development which features
the emergence of a highly differentiated social structure; (2) this
path features the centrality of free market entrepreneurs; and
(3) states that wish to succeed in economic development should
do as much as possible to free constraints on entrepreneurs and
investors.21'
The dependentista development theorist Andre Gunder
Frank observed that, although Parsons himself was not primar-
ily focused on the developing world:
Arguably "development" was the field in which Parsonianism became
the most influential, even though it was rather far removed from his
own immediate concerns. It was Parsons who translated Weber into
American... and it was [not] post-War but Cold War America that
used Parsonized Weber to conquer the post-colonial Third World in
apparent competition with the Soviet Union and China.
2 12
Parsons thus ultimately enjoyed his greatest influence in
development theory. Based at Harvard's Department of Social
Relations (DSR), Parsons was able to work with contemporaries
to shape an agenda for social science that could be immediately
transferred to U.S. foreign policy initiatives.2 13  The DSR, un-
and sociological theory.").
210. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 55.
211. This was the view, for example, represented by Hayek's reading of Weber.
212. Posting of Andre Gunder Frank, to franka@fiu.edu (March 18, 2002), avail-
able at httpJ/ rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/agfmsgl4.html. Frank was a central pro-
ponent of dependency theory, and also was perfectly aware of the interconnections
between Parsons, as an interlocutor of Weber, and modernization theorists such as
W.W. Rostow.
213. GILMAN, supra note 55, at 73. Gilman's description of the influence of Par-
sons in the emergence of this scholarly agenda is worth quoting at length:
U.S. foreign policy needs and the ambitions of Parsons and his collabora-
tors would provide the foundation for a social scientific theory of social
change, which would eventually come to be known by the name moderniza-
tion theory. [Parsons' Department of Social Relations or DSRI would shape
modernization theory .... First, Parsons articulated more fully than any
other contemporary American scholar... the concept of modernity that
would provide a fundamental, if usually implicit, template for both intellec-
tuals and policy makers in their understanding of the desirable direction
and ultimate goal of change in the postcolonial world. Second, [DSR] mem-
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derwritten by the Carnegie Corporation, sponsored scholarly ex-
changes with Edward Shils and others at the University of Chi-
cago for the purpose of establishing a single, general account of
modernity in the social sciences.1
This account contained all of the qualities described above.
The definition of modernity as occurring through evolution
along a single, universal path, characterized and spurred pri-
marily by social "values," and leading to a highly "differenti-
ated" social structure in which bureaucratic governance, modern
capitalism, and democracy all naturally co-existed. Parsons
viewed the United States as occupying the apex of this evolu-
tionary trajectory. "Moreover, since historical change had to
come from outside the system, Americans were obligated to go
out and help other societies get moving toward greater differen-
tiation."15 Parsons' prescriptions for "help" were "welcomed
with especial warmth in development studies." 1 The applica-
tion of Parsonian analysis to the objective of economic develop-
ment would produce one of the leading policy frameworks of the
mid-to-late twentieth century, Modernization Theory. 217 Mod-
ernization Theory, in turn, would shape later approaches to le-
gal reform, carrying forward central tenets of Parsonian theory.
CONCLUSION
This paper constitutes a preliminary consideration of how a
critical re-reading of Weber might impact the field of law and
development. While the scope of this paper is limited to a reas-
sessment of Parsonian sociology in the context of legal reform,
the paper demonstrates the need for a more thorough account of
the implications of contemporary re-readings of Weber for law
and development discourse.
bers helped redirect postwar social theory away from social critique and
toward the creation of a descriptive... theory of human action .... This
social theory would help justify the creation of technologies of social reform,
mostly applied to non-Western countries. Third, the DSR was the institu-
tional fountainhead for the promotion of Parsonian social theory, which
provided the foundation for modernization theory.... [T]he DSR provided
an institutional presence for the employment and training of students of
modernization. Most of the sociologists associated with modernization the-
ory had some affiliation with the DSR as either professors or collaborators.
Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 88.
216. Id. at 79.
217. Id. at 73.
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